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1. Introduction
For almost thirty years the Spanish infrastructure for research and technological de-
velopment was dominated by a single type of actor: Public Research Centres1. Univer-
sity and business research were practically non existent. All State efforts in R&D were
channelled through PRCs, dependent upon specific Ministries, that acted under a modi-
fied principle of “delegation” [1] and were managed under a system of “bureaucratic
hierarchical authority”, with politically appointed directors that freely allocated inter-
nally the resources received directly from government.
However in the eighties and in the nineties, Spanish Public Research Centres faced
changes in their environment that simultaneously pressed them to make choices and
offered them the instruments to adapt. The transformation of the environment in which
PRCs operated was a consequence of both conscious political design aiming to reor-
ganise the State action in support of research (the emergence of strategic R&D pro-
grammes) and of changes in the economic context of public research activity. The ori-
gins of these processes are traceable back to the period of transition to democratic rule
and the economic crisis, although the main push forward of this transformation came
from the reform of the Spanish research system launched in the eighties.
When the socialist government went into office, in December 1982, it made a con-
sistent commitment to support and promote science and technology. Significant in-
creases in public R&D funding  helped to double the level of R&D expenditures over
the GDP from 0,5% in 1982 to 1,0 % in 1990.
The socialist government also made a programme for reforms, in the science and
technology policy domain, that affected the performing institutions (e.g. the Law of
University Reform passed in 1983), the basic objectives and tools of public intervention
(e.g. the approval of the National R&D Plan) and even the overall way of organising
and co-ordinating public actions (e.g. setting up the Interministerial Commission for
Science and Technology-CICYT). A basic building block and a symbolic milestone of
this reforming strategies was the approval in 1986 of the Law for the Promotion and
General Coordination of Scientific and Technical Research (Law 13/1986), popularly
known as the Law of Science.
The Law of Science defined the basic rules, institutions and organisations of the
Spanish science and technology policy domain and altered the administrative and finan-
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1
 We will use the abbreviation PRCs besides the fact that the collective label in Spanish is OPIs, or Or-
ganismos Públicos de Investigación.
2cial regulations under which the Spanish PRCs operated. Public Research Centres were
transformed into financial autonomous organisations, while maintaining their “adminis-
trative” dependence under their umbrella Ministries, that were allowed to obtain exter-
nal non-budgetary funding, either through engaging in competition for European, na-
tional or regional R&D resources or through the establishment of contracts with enter-
prises. Then the Law made the PRCs more flexible to cope with the changes, by open-
ing the door for diversification their sources of funding and by slightly changing from
direct budgetary to non direct-budgetary appropriations. But these changes also contrib-
uted to enhance PRCs autonomy of decision vis à vis their ministries of affiliation and
the independence of individual researchers from the authority of the PRCs directors.
All these transformations, together  with the stagnation and later reduction in real
terms of direct budget appropriations in the nineties, resulted in new pressures and in-
centives for PRCs to adapt. If we were to take the funding strategies of the PRCs as the
behavioural variable to be explained, the question is to what extent did this new envi-
ronment produce the “adaptive reaction” [2] of the PRCs. We also take into account the
change in PRCs’ funding as an indicator of more deep and relevant transformations of
the overall science and technology system.
How did these changes affect the funding strategies of Spanish PRCs? As we will
show, the response of PRCs to this new environment varied considerably. One group of
PRCs did in fact begin to diversify its sources of income, increasing the importance of
non-budgetary sources over the total income of the organisation. Other PRCs, on the
contrary, remained much the same, despite the new opportunities opened by the  new
regulations. Therefore, the variation goes from those Research Centres that obtained
40% of their funding outside direct ministerial budgetary appropriations to those that
developed their activity almost completely within those financial limits.
What we try tentatively to explain in this paper is this variation in the degree of ad-
aptation of the PRCs, measured by the proportion of external non direct ministerial
budgetary appropriations in their total expenditures. We argue that the diverse dynamics
of change of the various PRCs, in response to the new environment, could be explained
mainly through the analysis of the institutional arrangements and organisational vari-
ables. We assume relevance of historical processes, that is “path dependency” [3,4] and
“organisational inertia” [5]. In other words, the diversity of outcomes observed when
PCRs are confronted with similar changes in their environment is attributable to the
different institutional arrangements and trajectories of each organisation. Our task here
is to find commonalties and differences.
According to our hypotheses, the degree of diversification in the PRCs’ funding
strategies will be shaped by three set of variables: the strength of the relationship with
the ministry of affiliation, the nature of the work undertaken by the research organisa-
tion and the nature of the individual incentive schemes within PRCs. All of them are, in
turn, part of the institutional arrangements. How do these factors relate to one another
and how do they influence the funding strategies of PRCs?
The relative strength or weakness of the link between the PRC with the ministry of
affiliation matters all PRC directors are political appointees, the degree of delegation of
the mission  and the form of relationship between the principal (Ministry) and the agent
(research performing organisation) [6, 7, 8, 9], is likely to  play a role in the explanation
of the differences. Whenever we find strong dependence we are likely to see  some
ministerial resistance, even if  the PRCs gain flexibility within the new legal framework,
this implied a loss of control on the part of the ministry. Also we observed important
differences in the timing of incorporation of each PRC to the new rules and the differ-
ences in timing appear to account for some of the differences in outcomes.
3The type of link with the ministry of affiliation is also related with our second hy-
pothesis: The nature of the research mission also matters. Behind a single word (re-
search) there are significantly different set of activities with diverse logic and require-
ments[10, 11] that could be described in a continuum between general knowledge pro-
ducers and specific service providers. This specificity also provide diverse external
funding opportunities to the PRCs and chances that research products of each organisa-
tion have in the market.
Lastly, the internal regulations of the research organisation usually condition the
distribution of incentives within the organisation among its individual members. Re-
searchers income and careers are basic determinants of their research performance [12,
13, 14]. If managers in PRCs were to be interested in raising external funding they have
to try to build up systems of incentives to encourage their researchers to apply for com-
petitive funding, that would complement their moral commitment, regardless of the
formal authority the PRCs director has over its research officials.
The paper is organised as follows: the next section analyses the changes in the sci-
ence and technology environment, as a consequence of the reforms and the evolution of
the public direct budgetary appropriations. In section 3 we will describe some general
features of the Spanish PRCs selected. Section 4 contains the core of the analysis and
the development of the explanatory variables that could account for the present differ-
ences in the funding strategies of the PRCs. We finish with some brief conclusions and
some prospects of some emerging dynamics.
2. The changing environment of Spanish PRCs
The Spanish R&D system was in the seventies very small from the point of view of
resources, hierarchically ill-defined and uncoordinated, low-quality, and with little or no
connection between basic research, applied research and technological innovation.
There was a duality that came from the fact that the few existing resources and the few
efforts made to coordinate and determine research priorities were concentrated on serv-
ing the purposes of economic development [15,16, 17]. In fact, there was a high level of
discontent in the Spanish scientific community, because scientists considered that their
interests in the production of knowledge were being put aside in favour of a bureau-
cratic approach for the definition of research priorities and the decisions over research
funding [18].
During the dictatorship of Franco the PRCs were the only places in the country to
develop research activities. There was almost no other “R&D actors”, since research in
universities and private firms was negligible. In the first OECD review of Spanish sci-
ence policy, this particular issue was stated clearly: “the great part of the scientific re-
search is undertaken in Government Centers or Institutions (...) from the financial
standpoint, 85 % of the total country’s research costs are channelled through (..) seven
centres” [19]. In order to understand the transformation of the R&D system in Spain it is
necessary to understand that the State had been a key player. .
Spanish PRCs, with the exception of the CSIC2, were agencies established by their
respective ministries in order to pursue their ministerial research interests and needs.
PRCs had a mission to accomplish and were therefore economically dependent on the
budget appropriations of their ministries of affiliation that, in turn, had the ultimate say
over them. This fact was to a large extent at the origin of the heterogeneity and lack of
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4co-ordination of the Spanish science policy during the pre-Constitutional period. The
kind of internal arrangements that characterised Spanish PRCs were specific to their
research domains and ministerial dependencies. Although they all had civil servant
status, the requirements, professional careers, wages, and organisational structures, var-
ied significantly from one PRC to another. Likewise, their research activities were car-
ried out in isolation from one another, attending, almost uniquely, to the research inter-
ests and needs of their respective ministries.
The dynamic of change that has affected the environment of PRCs, is first the result
of institutional and organisational reforms developed by the government in this policy
domain and the process of redefining public intervention in relation to S&T, and sec-
ond, due to the fate and fortune of the R&D public funding during that period.
2.1. Reshaping the institutions for S&T: The 1986 Law of Science.
When the socialist prepared their political program for the 1982 elections, the
“situation of science and technology” was already a social problem [20] to be tackled
with political action. Problems such as the low level of investments in R&D in compari-
son with other European countries; the lack of contact between the academic, CSIC and
other PRCs research with the economy and societal needs; the huge technology trade
deficit, and the lack of coordination of public intervention in the R&D system, were all
part of the characterisation of the situation, that in fact was labelled as “the lack of a
science and technology policy” [21].
The new political approach was based on a combination of the traditional “Bernal-
ist” vision of the Spanish political left of “putting science to the service of society" and
economy, plus the imitation of the emerging “EC R&D framework programme model”.
Among the political initiatives derived from this new approach were the decisions to
carry out a formal selection of national R&D priorities and a continuous call for coordi-
nation of public action in the R&D system. This political action culminated with the
enactment of the “Law of Science” that institutionalised the new proposals through the
creation of a policy system articulated under the pluri-annual “National R&D Plan” and
the consolidation of the authority of the CICYT (Inter-ministerial Commission for Sci-
ence and Technology).
One of the basic issues describing the situation of S&T in Spain has been the lack of
coordination [22] both between different actors in the R&D system and within the pub-
lic R&D sector. Attempts to increase the coordination of research activities and the
public action have been an issue of reference for the initiatives of S&T policy makers.
Through the creation of a new institutional structure some new principles were clearly
set up and accepted: setting “national R&D priorities” or strategic R&D; actions in fa-
vour of connecting R&D academic actors with society such as: the “university-firms
collaborative R&D programs”, “technology transfer initiatives”, or “technology transfer
institutional infrastructures”; “competitive funding” that was assumed to be the norm
for the future; and “peer review guaranteed by the State” [23] was introduced as a se-
lection process for R&D projects.
Additionally the Law of Science included a second set of provisions referring to
Public Research Centres which aim was to try to homogenise their different situations,
to provide them of flexibility and to encourage them to align (and coordinate) their re-
search activities with the national R&D priorities.
5The 1986 Law of Science identified six “Public Research Bodies” (CSIC, CIEMAT,
ITGME, INTA, IEO, INIA)3 under direct ministerial dependence, and they were defined
as subject to some common principles of organisation and action. The Law changed
some of the administrative and financial regulations under which the PRCs operated,
and institutionalised a new common organisational field [24] for these Public Research
Centres. The most important regulations affected the economic management conditions,
the flexibility for hiring non civil servant researchers, and the possibilities of creating
new individual economic incentives: a) These six PRCs (later on others joined the club)
were transformed into autonomous state entities (“autonomous commercial bodies”)
that were allowed to obtain external funding, either through engaging in competition for
State resources or through the establishment of contracts with enterprises. b) Addition-
ally they were endowed with special flexible mechanisms, outside of the regular ones in
public administration, for hiring researchers to carry on funded R&D projects. c) The
Law also approved the possibility (subject to further development and approval by the
Ministry of Economic Affairs. Treasure and Finance) that some of the income, derived
from contracts signed with public or private entities for the execution of the scientific
work or technical advice, could be transferred to the individual researchers as a produc-
tivity bonus; an individual incentive system could entered into these public research
bodies regularly functioning under the rules of the “civil service”. d) Also the PRCs
were assigned some relevant functions in relation to the definition of objectives and
implementation of National, Sectorial or Regional R&D policies, but in practice they
never were developed properly. These internal regulations increased the number of re-
sponses available to both management and researchers within the organisation when
coping with their environment.
The question is in what sense were the access to non-budgetary competitive funding
and the more flexible administrative conditions meant to provide research actors with
incentives for engaging in a more responsive, accountable and autonomous behaviour?
Firstly, by allowing the establishment of research contracts with enterprises the Law
was encouraging greater responsiveness on the part of PRCs to the economic and tech-
nical demands of Spanish enterprises. Secondly, although PRCs were offered alternative
funding sources, most of these alternatives were related, someway or another, with the
priority programmes defined by the National R&D Programme and, therefore, the re-
search actors were still pushed into the research priorities of the State. Accountability
would thus be enhanced because the more the number of competitive programmes that
PRCs could apply for, the higher the level of competitiveness among the research or-
ganisations. This, in turn, was expected to provide them with incentives to make better
quality research and in a more efficient way. Finally, by allowing PRCs access to exter-
nal competitive funding, the Law was offering these organisations a set of alternatives
that they did not have before. Spanish PRCs faced now different choices, concerning
their sources of funding, and therefore were able to make explicit decisions about their
research strategies.
The conditions for an increased level of autonomy of PRCs from their respective
ministries had been settled. However, making use of such autonomy was something for
the Research Centre to decide and to develop.
In summary, with reference to the changing environment, the emergent discourse
was clear enough: although not arriving to a radical “market oriented reform”, an in-
creased bureaucratic pressure to align the research agendas of the universities and PRCs
with the economic and social needs of Spanish society was consolidated. The decision
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6makers installed the “principle of competitive funding” as a basic way of financing re-
search, and the promotion and incentives for “external funding”, either public, through
the European, National, Sectorial or Regional R&D Plans, or private, through contracts
with firms in joint R&D or the provision of scientific or technical services. With the
expected increases in the public budgets of the different R&D programmes the govern-
ment hoped to attract interest and to mobilise researchers in the pursuit of the national
objectives. Some other political actions taken in those years, such as the reform of the
University system, giving Universities an autonomous status, although funded with
public money, also contributed to change the R&D environment. With the government
increasing attention in university research and promotion of R&D within firms, the
PRCs  lost in those years their centrality in the Spanish R&D system.
 2. 2. R&D budget stagnation during the 90s
The evolution of the amount of public funding available to research actors, in addi-
tion to their forms, was another determinant in the transformation of the R&D environ-
ment. When the socialists arrived to power, Spain dedicated about 0,5% of its GDP to
R&D activities. The level of expenditure was very small compared with other European
countries such as Germany (2,52%), France (2,06%), Great Britain (2,27%), or even
Italy (0,90%) [25]. It was one of the priorities of the socialist government to increase the
level of State expenditure on R&D to European standards, but besides the political
commitment, public funding would depend on the evolution of the State budget over
time.
In fact, the evolution of the R&D government appropriations had followed two very
diverse patterns. Since 1983 to 1990 we can observe a significant increase of the Span-
ish R&D investment pushed by the public funding committed. In that period Spain rep-
resents a case of fast growing R&D expenditures, even if only considering the govern-
ment performed R&D.
Table 1.-Total Government R&D Appropriations by country. (Million Ecus, 1990 PPS)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Belgium 726 798 922 947 934 978 976 1,007 1,073
Denmark 292 406 596 602 557 533 575 641 635
Germany 10,048 10,781 11,164 12,597 12,613 12,256 11,821 11,837 11,984
Spain 704 1,269 2,360 2,357 2,282 2,177 2,166 2,305 2,127
France 8,149 11,306 12,653 12,662 12,021 11,620 11,424 10,769 10,773
Irland 119 114 108 117 128 138 131 179 196
Italy 2,765 4,867 6,340 6,552 7,013 5,988 5,540 5,624
Austria 461 564 664 771 796 849 915 897 873
Portugal 164 291 361 396 504 407 467 467
Finland 306 434 615 673 702 719 715 731 708
Sweden 1,337 1,510 1,628 1,694 1,684 1,668 1,605 1,638
UK 6,905 8,245 7,509 7,131 6,886 7,136 6,765 7,083 6,909
Total EU 33,723 44,399 48,609 50,131 49,740 48,560 47,149 47,447 45,400
Source: European Commission (1997) Second European Report on S & T Indicators 1997. Brussels:
CEC. EUR 17639.
However the situation changed in the nineties, and it consolidate a period (that ap-
pears to have finished since 1997) of relatively stalemate, or decrease in real terms, of
the public effort in support of R&D.
7Figure 1 shows how even the R&D expenditure performed in the government sector,
that is the PRCs, grew significantly in the years of the reform, mainly 1985-1990.
Figure 1. Total Government sector Expenditure on R&D (million Ecus 1990 PPS)
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EUR 17639.
Besides big increases of the public investments in R&D in the eighties, we can ob-
serve in Table 2 that the overall government sector, was growing during eighties weaker
than other Spanish R&D sectors, that is the PRCs were loosing ground. Public funding
became much more significant for universities and private firms, because in 1980 the
R&D government appropriations expended in PRCs represented the 57,2 %, while in
the mid-eighties and nineties the figure decreased to 32-36 %.
8Table 2.- Percentage of total Government R&D Appropriations expend in Government
R&D sector by country
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Belgium 14.5 14.9 16.6 15.8 9.9 9.7
Denmark 51.4 44.1 39.3 40.0 44.3 48.6
Germany 31.4 35.3 35.2 35.1 37.1 37.5 37.3
Spain 57.2 35.9 32.6 34.3 35.1 36.4 35.8 33.8
France 38.0 39.7 42.2 39.7 39.2 41.0 40.5 43.7
Irland 58.8 43.5 35.9 37.5 40.6 48.9 37.4
Italy 46.4 41.1 36.8 37.3 32.7 35.0 35.9 35.9
Austria 19.1 19.7
Portugal 40.9 32.6
Finland 45.9 43.6 43.2 42.9 43.1 42.8 40.2
Sweden 10.1 9.2 10.7 11.2
UK 44.7 35.2 31.7 35.2 36.6 35.8 39.4 37.2
Total EU 37.1 33.8 34.6 34.7 34.0 35.0 35.4 35.4
Source: : European Commission (1997) Second European Report on S & T Indicators 1997. Brussels:
CEC. EUR 17639.
The stagnation of the research budget can also be considered as part of the environ-
mental change to which Spanish PRCs have been responding in the last years.  Figure 2
shows the ups and downs of the direct R&D budget government appropriations.
Figure 2. Spanish Budgetary appropriations for R&D ("Function 54 of the 
Annual Budget") (constant pesetas of 1996) 
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Source: Presupuestos Generales del Estado, various years.
However by the end of the eighties and early nineties, in addition to the National
R&D Programmes, new forms of external funding have emerge and consolidated such
as the funding from the international R&D Programmes, the EU R&D Framework Pro-
grammes, the funding from the regional Governments or funding from other specific
9sectorial sources such the Health Research Fund (FIS), the Agriculture R&D Sectorial
programmes, etc.
One would therefore expect that these reductions of direct R&D appropriations cuts
would press the research organisation into the diversification of its research funding
sources, regardless of the institutional trajectories of each organisation. What we found,
on the contrary, is that the institutional trajectories explanation still holds under condi-
tions of decrease of budget-appropriations.
3. The different responses of Spanish PRCs to the new opportunities
The persistence of a multiplicity of centres depending on the different Ministerial
Departments was, to a large extent, at the origin of the Spanish  PRCs’ heterogeneity.
This situation  was identified by the policy entrepreneurs of the eighties as one of the
main causes of lack of coordination in Spanish science policy. Historically there were
significant differences in the structures and functioning between the different centres,
due to the fact that at the time the Spanish Public Administration was far from being a
single and coherent entity. However PCRs had in common a direct budget appropriation
mechanism for funding their activities directly dependent on their respective ministries.
The allocation of resources for research was made internally in the PCRs, following the
“administrative authority criteria” of the directors, whom in most cases  were an ap-
pointed General Director of the Ministry. Other external sources for funding or any kind
of “competitive funding” at the time were negligible. In some cases,  ministerial de-
pendence was so strong for the PRCs that it was legally not permitted to accept external
funding, either in the form of grants or contracts. The research staff was treated merely
as public officials,  who were expected to  follow the instructions coming from above in
the pursuit of their duties.
In this section we are going to present a brief description of the most important
Spanish PRCs and of their different responses to their new environments. We will take
as an indicator the extent to which the PRC has been obtaining non direct budgetary
funding. In table 3 we present a list of the most relevant Spanish PRCs ([26, 27]
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Table 3.- Some Spanish Public Research Centres (PRCs)
Acronym Legal name 1999
English literal
translation
Ministry of de-
pendence 1999
Most relevant
Areas of Scien-
tific and Tech-
nical expertise
Similar or-
ganisations in
France, Ger-
many,  U. K.,
Italy
CSIC
Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones
Científicas
Higher Council for
Scientific Research
Ministry of Edu-
cation and Culture
All kinds of basic
and applied re-
search
CNRS, MPG,
CNR
CIEMAT
Centro de Investiga-
ciones Energéticas,
Medioambientales y
Tecnológicas
Centre for Energy,
Environmental and
Technological Re-
search
Ministry of Indus-
try and Energy
Energy, nuclear,
environment
CEA, KfK,
UKAEA,
ENEA
ITGME
Instituto Tec-
nológico Geominero
de España
Spanish Institute for
Geomining Tech-
nology
Ministry of Envi-
ronment
Geology,  Min-
ing
BRGM, BfGR,
BGS/NERC,
SGI
INTA
Instituto nacional de
Técnica Aeroespacia
“Esteban Terradas”
“Esteban Terradas”
National Institute
for Aeroespace
Technology
Ministry of De-
fense
Aeronautic,
space, electronic,
communications,
CERT-
ONERA, DLR,
DERA, CIRA
CEHIPAR
Canal de Experien-
cias Hidrodinámicas
del Pardo
“El Pardo” Hidro-
dynamic Model
Basin
Ministry of De-
fense Ship design
BEC, HSV
GmbH, DRA,
INSEAN
INIA
Instituto Nacional de
Investigación y
Tecnología Agraria
y Alimentaria
National Institute
for Agriculture and
Food Research and
Technology
Ministry of Agri-
culture, Fishing
and Food
animal health,
forestry, agri-
culture food, fito
&  zooge-netic
resources
INRA,
FAL/IPK,
BBSRC,
ISC/ISZA
IEO Instituto Español deOceanografía
Spanish Institute for
Oceanography
Ministry of Agri-
culture, Fishing
and Food
Oceanography,
fisheries,
aquacul-ture,
marine enviro-
nement
IFREMER,
BfF, DFR, --
ISCIII Instituto de Salud
“Carlos III”
“Carlos III” Health
Institute
Ministry of Health
and Consumer
Affairs
Health and Bio-
medical Reearch
INSERM, GSF,
MRC/NIMR,
ISTISAN
CEDEX
Centro de Estudios y
Experimentacion de
Obras Públicas
Centre for Public
Works Studies and
Experimentation
Ministry of Public
Works
materials, public
works hydrogra-
phy environment
LCPCh, BASt,
TRLL, ISMES
The CSIC is the only Centre that can be characterised as an all-round research or-
ganisation, because it is the only one that covers all areas of research. The rest of them
are, in fact, mission agencies, established by their respective ministries in order to pro-
vide scientific knowledge and qualified technical support required by those socio-
economic sectors under ministerial responsibility. The institutional path of development
of each Centre has conditioned the kind of intramural research carried out. The CSIC is
not only the biggest Public Research Centre, in terms of budget and personnel, but also
the one that concentrates its activity mostly in basic scientific research. The rest of
PRCs, as agents created to serve the purposes of their respective ministries, concentrate
most part of their activities on technical support and applied research.
The INIA was the result of a merge, in 1971, of the Instituto de Investigaciones
Agronómicas (Institute of Agricultural Research), with a marked professional character
linked to the professional development of the agriculture engineers, the Instituto Fore-
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stal de Investigaciones (Institute of Research Forestry) connected to forest engineers,
and the Patronato de Biología Animal (Board of Animal Biology) linked to the veteri-
nary surgeons. As in many other countries the agricultural, animal and forestry research
was linked to the agriculture extension services. Two significant features affect INIA.
First the fact that in 1985 the INIA was seriously restructured because many of the re-
search facilities (all outside Madrid) were transferred to the control of the Regional
Governments. As a consequence the INIA budget fell to 50 %, and its personnel was
reduced in more than 60%. The second important issue is that INIA and the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fishing and Food manages a pluri-annual R&D programme, the “Sectorial
Plan for Research in Agriculture and Food”, with approximately 1,500 millions pesetas
that goes mainly to the INIA research institutes and associated Regional Agriculture
Research Centres (ex-INIA).
Dependent on the same Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing and Food, is the Oceano-
graphic Research Institute (IEO), that in fact had been integrated under this Ministry in
the eighties. Despite the fact that it has most of its centres in the Spanish coast, the IEO
had not been transferred to the Regional governments.
The INTA is a singular centre because it is dependent on the Ministry of Defence,
despite the fact that its activities are much more associated to the ESA or NASA, with
space and aeronautical research. The CIEMAT is the re-named Nuclear Energy Com-
mission (Junta de Energía Nuclear), and concentrates its activities mainly in the area of
energy and nuclear research and its impact in the environment. Historically, it also has
had the surveillance and control of the nuclear facilities, but after the creation of the
Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (Nuclear Security Board), these activities lost ground at
CIEMAT. For both INTA and CIEMAT their involvement in collaborative international
research is very significant due to the singular technology areas in which they work that
need large facilities and scale and develop in the frame of international collaboration.
The ISCIII has been mainly concentrated in knowledge provision and scientific ad-
vice to the Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs. However, some other activities are
holding within the Institute, such as the National Health School. Additionally, one spe-
cific feature of this centre is that, since 1996, its budget includes the Health Research
Fund (FIS-Fondo de Investigaciones Sanitarias), with almost 5,000 millions pesetas for
1999, that finances most of the health and biomedical research in Spanish Hospitals
through competitive procedures.
In the group of more technical assistance and service providers for the government,
and less research oriented centres, we have the last three PRCs: ITGME, CEDEX and
CEHIPAR. Even the definition of their mission, for example for CEDEX says that its
main function is “technical assistance and services for Public Works and Urban Plan-
ning; and “research and development” represents less than 15% of the direct state
budget appropriations for CEDEX. The ITGME is the Spanish Geological Survey. From
this point of view these centres have the possibility to sell their services.
Our interest is how did all these changes affect the structures and behaviour of
Spanish PRCs and to what extent the research strategies of the different PRCs have fol-
lowed, due to similar environmental pressures, a process of homogenisation or differen-
tiation. As we will argue, the homogeneous political design for PRCs appeared to pro-
duce heterogeneous effects on them.
Since 1986, it is possible to observe a significant level of variation in the adaptation
of the PRCs to the new context. We measure the “adaptive reaction” of the PRCs with
the weight of the external funding over the total R&D expenditures. This variation im-
plies different levels of resource dependency on the part of PRCs in the development of
their activities and this, in turn, has affected differently their research strategies and
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their internal dynamics. It is this variation and its impact on the internal dynamics and
research strategies of PRCs which is what we want to tentatively explain in this paper.
We will argue that the degree of openness of PRCs to external sources of funding is the
final outcome of a complex interaction between the internal dynamics of research or-
ganisations and the external environment in which they are embedded. When research
organisations are subject to similar environmental changes, as was the case in Spain, the
diversity of outcomes is attributable to the different institutional trajectories in which
the decisions of individual actors within the organisation are embedded.
However, after a consolidation in 1988 and 1989 of these significant budget in-
creases, a long period of stagnation in public R&D funding started. As the evolution of
the State budget worsened, during the 90s, so did the public funding of PRCs through
the budget appropriations of their respective Ministries. Since 1990 we have witnessed a
process of stagnation, even decrease in real terms, of the direct budget appropriations
for PRCs.
Figure 3. Direct Government Budget Appropriations for
the Public Research Organisations in Real Terms, 1988-1998 ( 1988 = 100) 
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As we show in Figure 3, all the Public Centres suffered funding stagnation and de-
cline after 1989, with some exception such as the INTA, the military and aerospace
PRC, and later, the ISCIII, for health research, but in this case it is a statistical artefact
because what appears is actually the integration of the FIS into the budget of the Carlos
III Health Institute.
As a summary with respect to the socio-economic environmental changes, we
should emphasise two different processes. On the one hand, an increased social pressure
to align the research agendas of the universities and PRCs with the economic and social
needs of Spanish society. On the other hand, after a rise of public funding in the eighties
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–the highest rates in the EU- a stagnation or decline in real terms of the State expendi-
ture in R & D activities.
Intuitively, one would expect that the bigger the public direct R&D allocation de-
crease as a consequence of a decrease in the budget appropriations, the bigger the in-
centive of the research organisation to move the attention towards non-budgetary
sources of funding, if such possibility is available. However, as we will show below,
this income decrease does not explain why some PRCs have diversified their sources of
funding while others have not. We will see, in the following sections, to what extent this
expectation has occurred. Nonetheless, the level of external competitive funding
reached by the PRCs since 1986 varies significantly from one to another. At present, the
CSIC is the most externally funded, with 38% of its income coming from self-financing.
It is followed, as Table 4 shows, by the CIEMAT, with 31%. In the middle we find the
ISCIII (10%), and the ITGME (6%), while in the other extreme we see CEDEX, IT-
GME or CEHIPAR.
Table 4. Relevance of the non-direct government budget appropriations in the total
expenditure of the Spanish Public Research Centres (PRCs)
Acronym
Permanent
staff 1998
Direct Govern-
ment Budget
Appropriations
1999  (Mill.
Ptas)
Percentage of
‘external’
funding
1996 & 1997
Main Sources of external Funding
(ordered by relevance in 1996 or
1997)
CSIC 6,862 39,709.7 38%
National R&D Plan (40%)
Framework R&D Programme (28%)
Firm’s contracts (17%)
CIEMAT 1,146 7,877.3 31 %
EURATOM &  R&D F Programs
(34%)
Firm’s contracts (31%)
ITGME 329 3,485.5 6%
INTA 1,203 14,525.1 25% Firm´s contracts (80%)EU Funds (15%)
CEHIPAR 125 766.3 Less 5 %
INIA 530 5,521.4(*) 25%
Agriculture Sectorial R&D Pro-
gramme (40%)
National R&D Plan (40%)
Services (10%)
IEO 398 4,469.1 25% Framework R&D Programme (40%)Fishing Secretariat (40%)
ISCIII 2,082 16,288.6(**) 10 %
FIS (46%)
National R&D Plan (21%)
Framework R&D
Programme (18%)
CEDEX 795 5,611.9 Less 5%
(*) Includes the of Sectorial Programme for Agricultural R&D that amounts approximately to 1,500 Millions Ptas
(**) Includes the of Health Research Funding Programe (FIS-Fondo de Investigaciones Sanitarias) that amounts approximately to
5,000 Millions Ptas
This variation on the proportion of the external funding of the PRCs, the dependent
variable, however, cannot be explained linearly by the level of budget decrease that we
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have observed in the previous section. Some anomalies emerged in the adaptive re-
sponse. The PRCs that have witnessed the biggest stagnation of their budget do not be-
have in a similar direction. For the five PRCs with the worse evolution of the public
budget allocations and transfers, three of them, the ITGME, CEDEX, and CEHIPAR
(see Table 4) present the lower trend to self-financing; while CIEMAT and INIA appear
to react to the stagnation with big efforts of external funding. In the opposite direction,
the better treated by the evolution of public R&D appropriations, INTA, is one of the
most active in the search for external funding, while ISCIII has just a 10% of external
funding. Both the CSIC and the IEO react to the stagnation with the increase of external
funding.
Therefore, there must be some other explanation that accounts for this variation that
is not based, exclusively, on the level of direct budget decrease. Thus we need to define
much more the variables to account for the empirical diversity of the degrees of adapta-
tion. In the following pages we propose an institutionally base explanation.
4. Explaining diversity in the PRCs’ responses towards the diversification of
funding sources
In this section we want to explore how similar pressures for adaptation from the
changing environments gave way to different internal dynamics in each PRC, depending
on factors related to their respective institutional arrangements and trajectories.
As we have seen in the previous sections, apparently the Spanish PRC have been af-
fected by similar pressures for change: e.g. the effects of the consolidation of strategic
S&T policy as a dominant way of public intervention in mid eighties, or the stagnation,
freezing and even decreasing of the direct budgetary appropriations for the PRC. But
also the opportunities were opened for the management of the PRCs, with the new in-
stitutional arrangements, that allowed the PRCs to obtain external funding. But why are
their degrees of response of the PRCs, measured by the proportion of external funding
over the total budget, significantly different?
Our main argument is that PRC adaptation is mediated by a set of institutional vari-
ables, some of them associated to long term historical trajectories of development, that
is path dependent in some way. If we consider that the proportion of the external fund-
ing represents the funding strategy of the PRC, we can consider it the dependent vari-
able in our argument. Some institutional variables appear to be the independent vari-
ables to explain the variation in the outcome.
First we have to consider the diverse degree of PRC political dependence from the
Ministry, or put it in positive terms, the degree of autonomy of the PRC over its politi-
calcontrollers. The Ministerial authorities should approve, allow or encourage the
autonomy of their own PRCs. The rationale for that movement for the ministerial poli-
cymakers could be very diverse: to abandon of the old idea of subordination of the
PRCs to the needs of the Ministry, the acceptance of the new ideas of coordinated S&T
policy that should follow national R&D priorities or simple attempts to contribute to the
solution of the limitations for R&D activities imposed by budget restrictions. However
the effects, once the movement had been made, are irreversible, because to increase the
autonomy of their agents will mean to loose ground and authority over the selection of
their activities and research tasks. Then our argument predicts that the higher the politi-
cal dependence of the centres from its Ministry, the less incentives or pressures the PRC
management will have to adapt to the new environmental pressures. Or the stated oppo-
sitely, as more PRC autonomy is perceived from its Ministry the pressures for adapta-
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tion will be assimilated much rapidly. In our cases, the prediction would be that CSIC,
that has the higher degree of political autonomy will show stronger move to the new
funding strategy. In the opposite corner the ITGME, CEDEX o CEHIPAR, still very
linked to their Ministries will have more difficulties to move into the direction of the
new funding strategies.
Second, we have to consider some characteristics emerging from the interaction
between the type of specific research or service providing activity of the public centres
(the point in the continuum between generic knowledge producers and specific service
providers to the Ministries) and the external resource raising opportunities (e.g. the ex-
istence of specific international R&D funding programmes or clearly defined external
markets for selling services or knowledge). That is, we consider that the concrete and
substantive activity of the PRCs creates some specificity that should influence their op-
portunities to adapt their funding strategies. In this case our argument predicts that the
adaptation to the new funding strategies will be more intense in those PRCs that have at
their disposal, because of their technological area, big specialised international R&D
Programmes or clear markets for “selling” their services or competencies. The opportu-
nities for external funding of our PRCs are significantly different, that vary from the
existence of huge R&D programmes such as the nuclear research (EURATOM) or en-
ergy, immense contracts emerging from the ESA (Europeans Space Agency), or from
military technological developments, to smaller programmes relating with marine and
fishing research but very big financially in relation to the size of the PRC. Applying the
argument to our cases we should expect more adaptation of the funding strategy in the
case of CSIC, CIEMAT, INTA and IEO, than in the ISCIII, because in the area of clini-
cal or biomedical research  programmes in comparison are small. On the opposite ex-
treme very little relevance of external sources appears to be the case for “public works
testing” or “geological surveys” technologies.
The third important element in the explanation of the diversity of situations in terms
of the funding strategies is what we could call the individual research incentives to
search for the external funding. Since Merton studies, it is agreed that there is a scien-
tific ethos that will push the researcher to do their best; additionally modern analysis of
individual incentives and compensation systems, help us to relate the commitment of
the individual scientist in raising external funding with some rewards and compensation
systems, clearly associated to their differential performance in terms of  raising external
funding. In some cases, depending of the system, the incentives or rewards could be
either associated to the professional career or to the increases in the pay. Then our ar-
gument is that the different impacts of the internal compensation systems of the PRCs
set up by their managers will be a basic variable to explain the diverse commitment of
the individual researcher on the strategy proposed by the PRC manager of increasing the
availability of external funds. In addition the fact that having external funds increases
the autonomy and the independence of the individual researcher vis  a vis the direction
of PRC. Our predictions say that if the PRC have either clear research careers or sys-
tems of pay associated to the performance in raising external funds the PRCs will be
much more adapted to the new funding strategies. Our empirical observations confirm
this variable as relevant because CSIC is the only PRC that has both a relatively con-
sistent research career (in which the performance in the external funding is relevant) and
a special productivity bonus associated to getting external funds from firms or European
programmes, and the CSIC scores much higher in the proportion of external funding.
In the rest of the section we will focus on the specificity of our three main variables.
We will first look at the degree of political autonomy of the PRC from their Ministries,
and we will describe their reactions to the original proposal of the legislative changes
16
over PRCs included in the Law of Science, that somehow influenced the timing of ap-
plication of the new institutional environment  in other research centres. Then we will
focus separately on the interaction between the type or specific activity developed by
the PRC and the available opportunities for external research funding and how the man-
agers tried to encourage researchers' responses to the new environmental conditions.
Finally we will try to extract conclusions and to develop an explanation in what refers to
the changing funding strategies.
4.1.Political dependence as an obstacle to non-budgetary funding.
The diverse degree political dependence on the Ministry of each PRC is important.
The Ministerial authorities were to approve, allow or encourage the autonomy of their
own PRCs. When promoting the legislative changes for S&T system and for PRCs the
government was not free from discrepancies. In 1986, many ministries were involved in
R&D activities and one of the objectives of the Law was precisely to create a common
institutional structure under which this R&D activities would be co-ordinated. Inter-
ministerial negotiations took place during 1983 and 1984 in order to arrive to a consen-
sus on the contents of the Law. The main resistance to the reforms came from those
ministries that saw the reforms as a loss of authority over their own agencies in benefit
of the enhanced authority of the Ministry of Education and Science, that in practice was
the co-ordinating actor.4
Ministerial resistance made it difficult for the political entrepreneurs within the
Ministry of Education to advance a systematic approach for the functioning of the re-
search centres that were administratively part of the different ministries. The contents of
the Law finally presented to the Parliament for approval was the result of a complex
process of internal negotiations between the different ministries within the Spanish ex-
ecutive. As a result, some of the ideas defended by the reformers had to be altered in the
final text in order to reach a consensus over the Law.
Even though the new institutional arrangements of autonomous commercial bodies
were a clear advance in terms of the management practices and flexibility, some of the
Ministries rejected the idea. The will of the ministries to preserve the authority, hin-
dered the reformers’ attempt to foster, through legal mechanisms, more autonomous
PRCs. The immediate consequence was that not all PRCs in 1986 were transformed
from autonomous administrative bodies into autonomous commercial bodies, under the
provisions of the Law of Science. Some of them would not become commercial bodies
until very recently, this time lag ) could be relevant to explain the adaptation responses
and accounts for some of the different PRCs’ responses to the new conditions.
In 1986, six PRCs were included under the new legal status established in the Law
of Science: CSIC, CIEMAT, ITGME, INTA, INIA and IEO. During the following years
more PRCs became commercial bodies: CEDEX (1989), ISCIII (1991), CEHIPAR
(1999). According to our data, those organisations that first had access to the status of
commercial bodies are also the ones with higher levels of non-budgetary funding. The
only exception to this rule is ITGME, the “Geological Survey Centre”, which was part
of the first six, but appears to have with a low proportion of external funding in com-
parison with the overall budget.
                                                
4
 From an agency theory perspective, the access of the research organisation to external sources of fund-
ing alters the agency relationship with its corresponding ministry. The existence of more than one princi-
pal enhances the discretionary power of the agency, especially if those principals are uncoordinated or do
not share the same interests and objectives.
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This is not to say that the expected evolution of those PRCs whose time of incorpo-
ration has been shorter will be towards increased levels of self-financing. Among the six
organisations that first had access to external funding there are important differences in
terms of non-budgetary funding (from the 38% level of CSIC to the 6% of ITGME) that
also needs to be accounted for. But there is no doubt that timing of incorporation mat-
ters. Therefore, the reaction of the different ministries, as far as it determines the timing
of incorporation of PRCs to the new legal framework, is a factor that helps us to explain
the different responses of PRCs towards the diversification of their sources of funding.
4.2. Managerial approaches towards increasing the levels of external non-
budgetary funding
Having the opportunity to finance or increase the research at PRCs with non-
budgetary external funding sources does not necessarily imply that PRCs are interested
in obtaining those external resources. They might or might not have incentives to look
outside for funding resources when they have a guaranteed amount coming from direct
budget appropriations.
Although we could think that the major incentive to look outside for funding re-
sources would come from the level of budget restrictions the organisation has to face,
the data do not support in a linear way this expectation, as we have already seen in the
previous section. The level of budget restriction is an external pressure that forces the
management of the research organisation into making a choice, but does not determine
the final result. There are other pressures over the PRC directors (and researchers) that
either mobilises their researchers or brings use of their authority to push them to search
for funding.
Therefore, these other factors that account for the differences in the decisions
adopted by management include how much income is worth getting externally. The
organisational interest is shaped (in addition to the political autonomy of the Ministry)
by the external opportunities available to finance specifically their research and tech-
nological domain of expertise or competence. In our opinion, the nature of the mission
and the specificity of the scientific or technological area delegated on the organisation is
what helps us to explain, to a considerable degree, the pressures of the research organi-
sation in staying within the limits of the budget appropriations or, on the contrary, in
competing for external resources.
Concerning the nature of their mission, PRCs could be located in a continuum from
service providers to knowledge producers. Those PRCs whose mission, by way of their
historic-institutional trajectory, is concentrated on providing their respective ministry
with technical advise, expertise and services or which are overburdened with the re-
quirements of their own ministry will be less willing to look for external resources. The
management of these organisations does not see or find any advantages in competing
for resources since the organisation's results will be judged not by the increase in the
quality and quantity of its research activities but by the level of accomplishment of its
mission. In consequence, the organisation's income is much more dependent on the
good will of its ministerial superiors to transfer more ministerial resources to their
agency or to fight politically to get more budget appropriations on behalf of their
agency. Therefore, the research organisation will be better-off pressing internally to
obtain an increase in its budget than competing for resources externally. External fund-
ing will most probably be a negligible part of the organisation's income.
On the opposite side, those PRCs developing a general mission, will feel better off if
they increase their income externally. In these cases, PRCs dedicate a major part of their
activities to research and can therefore be characterised as knowledge producers. As
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such, they are willing to obtain as much funding as possible for their research activities
since more funding implies more research and this, in turn, leads to better results in
terms of knowledge production.
Also, getting more funding contributes to the cycle of reputation [28] for these or-
ganisations, which are seen as executing quality research and providing quality results.
This cycle of reputation will reinforce their competitiveness in obtaining more external
resources, but at the same time could be dangerous in such that it causes further reduc-
tion of the direct public budget appropriations due to standard practice of the Ministry
of Economic Affairs, Treasury and Finance.
The differences in the nature of the research mission imply, on the other hand, dis-
tinct requirements in terms of the level of economic funding needed by each area of
research. This will undoubtedly influence the decision of management and of individual
researchers about to what extent it is in the interest of the organisation or in their interest
to dedicate time and effort to compete externally for resources. Those research areas
that need greater levels of investment and/or funding in order to be carried out will have
more incentives to compete for external resources than those research areas that do not.
4.3. Individual research incentives
Analysis of individual incentives relates the commitment of the individual scientist
with raising external funding with some rewards and compensation systems, and is
clearly associated to their differential performance in terms of  raising external funding.
In some cases, depending of the system, the incentives or rewards could be either asso-
ciated to the professional career or to increases in pay.
Let us assume that the researchers working inside the same organisation, in addition
to the general ethos principles, act according to three different kinds of incentives: com-
pensation schemes, contextual pressures or authority and career rewards. Compensation
schemes are strictly referred to the income the researcher receives as a result of the po-
sition he/she occupies within the organisation. Contextual (or environmental) pressures
are referred to all those factors that press research actors to make a choice among a lim-
ited number of options. The authority of PRCs directors could also be an element of
pressure. We could think of internal funding restrictions as pressure that forces the re-
searcher into making a choice: stay within the limits of those restrictions or look outside
for non-budgetary funding. We think of career rewards as non-economic compensa-
tions, such as professional recognition (eg. change of status from junior researcher, to
senior researcher, to research professor), greater autonomy of decision, recognition
among peers, academic prestige and influence, self-satisfaction, or upwards mobility
within positions of the research organisation.
This assumption seems plausible enough. All we are saying is that researchers want
to do research (funded by external sources) because they obtain non-material rewards
and sufficient economic incentives to decide that scientific research is worth doing in
the first place. To do research, they want autonomy to decide what to work on, and eco-
nomic funding to carry out research activities. The more the researcher is guided by
economic incentives, such as compensation schemes, the more likely it is that he solves
the trade-off in favour of acquiring more money, in spite of a loss of autonomy. In the
opposite way, the more the researcher is guided by career rewards, the more likely it is
that he solves the trade-off in favour of increasing his autonomy of decision and his
career perspectives. In fact, one of the motivations of the researchers for searching ex-
ternal funding (or aligning over the priorities of the strategic R&D programmes) could
also be to gain autonomy vis à vis the hierarchies of the PRCs, because financial auton-
omy means research and professional independence.
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Research organisations might have incentives to look outside budget-appropriations
for resources, but in order to do so, they need individual researchers to be willing to do
it as well. Therefore, the management of the research organisation must think of a sys-
tem of incentives for researchers that will result in an alignment of their individual in-
terests to those of the organisation as a whole. The situation is not easy because in the
public centres the position of researcher has the status of civil servant, to which all the
regulations for the civil service compensations systems, appointments and career apply.
Researchers should find some clear economic or career advantages under the new
funding conditions in order to have an incentive to compete for resources. If competing
for resources, that is, if applying to non-budgetary sources of funding, means exclu-
sively more money for the organisation, researchers will have little incentive to work
hard in order to get those external funds. The extent to which this is so depends on the
level of centralisation of decisions within the organisation. The competition for re-
sources, as opposed to the previous situation of funding exclusively through budget ap-
propriations, undoubtedly has an impact in the authority relations within the research
organisation and, therefore, the attitude adopted by management will be of great rele-
vance, in this respect. Since management is now more dependent on researchers com-
mitment in order to get external funding, it will have clear incentives to provide those
researchers engaged in non-budgetary competitive funding with enhanced autonomy
and with economic and career rewards.
According to this, we can expect that those Centres most interested in getting exter-
nal resources will tend to offer compensation schemes and/or career rewards to their
researchers. These incentives will make it worth for researchers to compete for re-
sources on the regional, national and European R&D programmes, and through con-
tracts with enterprises. The final effect would therefore be an increase in the levels of
external funding of those PRCs. However the ability to build up pay or incentives
schemes for officials of the PRCs is very limited, because the compensation scheme is
dependent upon the Government, mainly the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Treasury
and Finance, and it follows a simple logic emerging from an attempt to homogenise
situations in the public sector and administration; it always tries to avoid special situa-
tions, that may create the dynamics of “labour demands”. (The salaries of the re-
searches, as in any other civil servant, have four basic components, and only one is
subject to “discretionality”: Base salary, specific complement, labour post complement
and productivity component. Additionally, researchers at universities and the CSIC
benefit from a systems of rewarding its scientific performance build up on personal cur-
ricula evaluation at national level  [29].
4.4.Changing funding strategies
Once we have suggested the main factors explaining the diversity of degrees of
adaptive response of PRCs in their funding strategies –namely the political autonomy of
PRCs vis a vis their Ministry of dependence, the nature of the research mission and its
interaction with the availability of external funds, and the nature of the individual in-
centive schemes within the research organisation– we still have to test or contrast them
empirically (see overview in Table 5). We have already seen that not all Centres in-
creased equally their levels of non-budgetary funding in response to the environmental
changes, despite a general tendency towards budget restrictions. Which PRCs have sig-
nificantly altered their funding strategies and why?
We have already seen that those public research centres which have altered most
significantly their funding strategies, and which, as a consequence, present a higher
level of external funding are CSIC, CIEMAT and INTA.
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Table 5.- Balance of situation for the PRCs
Acronym
Direct
Government
Budget
Apprs. 1999
(Mill. Ptas)
Other
funding
sources,
1996 or
1997
Trends on
Direct
Government
Budget
Appropriations
(1990-1998)
Became
Autonomous
Commercial
Entities
Nature of
the
Mission
(knowledge
producer
or service
provider)
Individual
Researcher
Incentives
CSIC 39,709.7 38% stay 1986 k.p. direct ones
ISCIII 16,288,6 10% stay/increase 1991 both civil serv.
INTA 14,525.1 25% increase/stay 1986 k.p. civil serv.
CIEMAT 7,877.3 31% decrease 1986 k.p. civil serv. *
CEDEX 5,611.9 5% decrease 1989 s.p. civil serv.
INIA 5,521.4 25% decrease 1986 both civil serv. *
IEO 4,469.1 25% stay 1986 k.p. civil serv.
ITGME 3,485.5 6% decrease 1986 s.p. civil serv.
CEHIPAR 766.3 1%. decrease 1999 s.p. civil serv.
* means some evaluation to establish RPT (see note 5)
The CSIC is the organisation that receives the largest amount of external funding
(38% of its income). This makes sense in terms of our explanation, since the CSIC can
be characterised as a knowledge producer, and as an all-round agency whose mission is
the general promotion of knowledge, regardless the area of research. At the same time,
the CSIC is engaged mostly in basic research and, since it covers all areas, some of
them require high levels of investment and funding while others present a good com-
petitive market position for their research results. From this, we can deduce a great in-
terest on the part of the CSIC to get external funding. This interest has led the CSIC to
establish an internal system of incentives based on both compensation schemes and ca-
reer rewards that, apparently, has had a positive effect over the level of external funding
achieved since 1986. The CSIC is the only public research centre in Spain that allows
each individual researcher to keep a fixed percentage (30%) of the funding received
externally, from contracts with enterprises or research projects financed under EU R&D
programmes. It is also the only one to offer the researchers a compensation scheme
called “extraordinary productivity bonus”. This bonus is incorporated to the salary of
those researchers that have been successful in the of evaluation of their research activi-
ties. It is offered every six years as an economic reward and is cumulative over time
(26). Concerning career incentives, the CSIC is the only Research Centre in which there
exists, together with a civil servant career, a research career quite similar to the univer-
sity standards. Upward mobility is therefore possible in two different ways: either by
ascending in the administrative hierarchy of positions, or by acquiring a superior re-
search status. Another non-material incentive that has made attractive for the research-
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ers of CSIC to compete for external resources is the enhanced autonomy of decision
making. Those researchers who get external funding for their research projects and ac-
tivities are free to decide what to work on. At the same time, getting external resources
might create a cycle of reputation for the researcher that works as another non-material
incentive to compete for resources.
The next group of centres that receive, comparatively, a significant amount of exter-
nal funding, and that occupy a medium position in the continuum between those most
externally funded and those less externally funded, are the CIEMAT (31% of its in-
come), the INTA, the IEO and the INIA (all with 25%). They can also be considered
knowledge producers. They depend on the Ministry of Industry and Energy, , on the
Ministry of Agriculture, , and on the Ministry of Defence, respectively  (see Table 3).
But their explicit mission is not to provide services but to promote and carry out re-
search and technological development in their respective areas: energy, agriculture,
oceanography, and aerospace. Their main activities are concentrated on basic research
and technological innovation.
The research areas in which they are involved require high levels of investment and
funding. From these factors we can infer that the management of these PRCs are inter-
ested in obtaining external funding for their research activities. However, although the
level of external funding is high (between 25% to 31%), none has developed the kind of
compensation schemes based on productivity bonus, present in the CSIC, and the career
perspectives for researchers depends exclusively on the improvement of their pay being
appointed to a better labour position in terms of complements.
Except for the CSIC, the wage levels inside the rest of PRCs depend on the job po-
sition in the RPT catalogue5, and the appointments are part of the same system that
works for all public administration. Comparing the level of wages between these PRCs
we also observe significant differences. These differences depend of the success in the
negotiations on the catalogues between the centres and the Ministry of the Economic
Affairs, Treasury and Finance. There is no “research career”, since upwards mobility is
achieved by ascension in the administrative hierarchy. However in some centres, like
INIA or CIEMAT, mechanisms of evaluation of R&D productivity had been taken into
account in the implementation of the rewards to research personnel using the RPT
catalogue.
The nature of their research areas could also explain the higher level of external
funding, at least in the cases of CIEMAT and INTA. Both are involved in highly inter-
nationalised scientific areas that require very important levels of investment on techni-
cally advanced infrastructures. They have strong incentives to get external funding by
engaging in European and international programmes that can afford the levels of expen-
diture required. The nature of the research area, therefore, exerts pressure in a definite
direction that is towards getting as much funding as possible.
INIA and ISCIII are centres that, in addition to knowledge production can be con-
sidered as service or knowledge providers to their Ministries. They both take advantage
of a special situation. Both PRCs manage two independent funds, from which their re-
searchers apply for funding: the Health Research Fund (FIS) and the Sectional Plan on
                                                
5
 The compensation systems of the civil servants are based on the modern idea of wage differentials de-
pending on the professional group of origin, the job, the performance and the seniority. Thus people from
the same professional groups can have significant wage differentiation, depending on the job post or the
performance. The way of implementing these principles all over the State is the so-called Labour Position
Catalogues (RPT or Relación de Puestos de Trabajo). All the public bodies must have this RPT, which is
used to differentiate and to incentive.
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Agriculture and Food R&D6 These programmes imply an extra funding, and could also
explain the low proportion of external funding of ISCIII. Since they manage extra
amounts of funding of considerable weight for research activities, and since they are
also involved in providing services to their respective ministries, these Centres could
have a minor pressure to look outside for external funds.
The CEDEX, ITGME and CEHIPAR present the lowest levels of external funding.
They are basically service providers. The research activities are just a small part of their
work. Their main clients are the public administrations, especially their Ministries.
Therefore, despite the new opportunities available for getting external resources, the
management of these organisations does not have clear incentives to do so. Moreover,
none of them have an available external market for their research products. In the three
cases, no compensation schemes or career rewards have been established for their re-
searchers besides the already mentioned civil servant career.
As a balance of the findings associated to the institutional variables we could sim-
plify the argument as dummy variables (presence or absence) to determine the optimum
situation in terms of adaptive response and the inertia situation of PRCs (see Table 6).
The variables include 1.- Financial pressures; 2.- Political autonomy on the Ministry; 3.-
General Knowledge producers (versus Service providers to their Ministries); 4.- Exter-
nal funding availability (Specific R&D programmes or markets); 5.- Internal individual
incentive schemes. The optimum would be the presence in a positive way of all the
variables (financial pressures, political autonomy, knowledge producers, available ex-
ternal funding and individual rewards incentives). The worse adaptive response would
be in the absence of all the variables.
Table 6.- Summary of some variables  affecting PRCs
financial
pressure
independence
from ministry
knowledge
producers
funding
alternatives
system of
incentives
CSIC yes yes yes yes yes
INTA, CIEMAT, IEO yes yes yes yes no
INIA, yes some mix yes no
ISCIII yes some mix no no
CEDEX, ITGME, CEHIPAR yes no no no no
The most externally funded research centres, the CSIC, have positive presence of all
the variables. The next group of PRCs,  INTA, CIEMAT, IEO, have a slightly different
situation because they also have high financial pressure, relative political autonomy, are
mainly applied knowledge developers, and also have very significant external funding
available. However although they having some of them hints of a research career, they
do not have any direct reward mechanism or productivity bonus associated to the good
individual performance in raising funds.
INIA would be in this group also, especially because the existence of alternative
funding. However it also could be part of a group with the Carlos III Health Institute
that lacks political autonomy because it is performing a mission for the Ministry, that
also represents a mixture of applied knowledge production and services provision to the
Ministry. External funding available for clinical research is very small and those for
basic biomedical research are highly competitive, and there are no direct reward mecha-
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nisms or productivity bonuses associated to good individual performance in raising ex-
ternal funds.
The fourth group, formed by the ITGME, CEDEX and CEHIPAR, have financial
pressures, they have political dependence on their umbrella Ministry, they produce
mostly services, provide technical testing and advise to the Ministry, and do not have
significant external R&D funds available. In addition they do not have any direct reward
mechanism or productivity bonus associated to good individual performance in raising
funds.
5. Tentative Conclusions
5.1. Main findings
The aim of this paper was to shed light on the process of organisational adaptation
of Spanish PRC's to the environmental changes that have affected them since the late
70s. The most important of these changes was the new financial and administrative
regulations introduced by the 1986 Law of Science under which the Spanish PRCs had
to operate in the future. These regulations increased the number of tools available both
to the management and to the researchers within the organisation for deciding on their
research strategies. Therefore, by enhancing the options available, incentives were set
up for the Spanish PRCs to transform themselves into more autonomous and flexible
organisations.
As we have seen, the response of PRCs to this new context has varied widely. De-
spite the possibilities opened for obtaining resources externally, the levels of external
funding reached by each Centre vary from the 38% of the CSIC to almost nil in other
cases. Likewise, although all PRCs had the opportunity to alter the internal incentive
schemes for their researchers, only a few made the attempt to develop the principle and
to negotiate with the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Intuitively, one would have expected that as income decreased it would have im-
proved the incentive of the research organisations to move towards external sources of
funding. However, as we have shown, this has not been the case. The level of budget
restriction has been a pressure that has forced PRCs to make choices, but has not deter-
mined the final result of those choices. We argue that the nature of the mission dele-
gated on the PRC and, maybe, the type of research areas in which the organisation is
involved are the factors that explain most of the variations. According to our main hy-
potheses:
a) PRCs that focus on the production of knowledge and with a loose relationship to
their respective ministry of affiliation will be more interested in obtaining exter-
nal funding.
b) PRCs whose areas of research demands more investment and funding will have
more incentives to compete for external resources than those which do not. At
the same time, those areas whose results have an outside market will do better in
the competition for external funding. The same can be said about the nature of
the services provided.
c) As a consequence, as greater the interest of the organisation in obtaining exter-
nal resources, the likelier the possibility for internal development of individual
incentive schemes that align individual interests with those of the organisation.
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d) In the absence of individual incentive schemes, the interest of the organisation to
obtain external funding might be impeded by the lack of interest of researchers
to compete for external resources which will only benefit the organisation.
Data suggest, that there is a causal relationship between the nature of the mission
and of the research area and the increase in the levels of external funding of PRCs. Also,
the managerial interest in obtaining external funding seems to be closely related to the
creation of new compensation schemes and/or career rewards for the researchers inside
the organisation7. However, these are yet tentative explanations. The whole system is
still evolving and has not come to a steady state; there is not enough of a time perspec-
tive to evaluate it definitely. Now at this point we interpret this hypotheses simply as
guide towards further empirical testing and theoretical development.
5.2. Some possible effects of non-budgetary funding over the internal dynamics
of PRCs
Despite the attempt of the PRCs most interested in obtaining external funding, to
align the interests of the researchers with those of the organisation in order to compete
externally for resources, the system of incentives established has produced certain un-
intended consequences. Individual incentives have successfully pushed researchers to-
wards the competition for external funding, but new problems of internal co-ordination
and conflict have emerged which, in turn, would affect its efficient functioning and the
final results of its work.
The access to external sources of funding for individual researchers breaks the chain
of authority relations within the research organisation. A process of decentralisation of
decision power takes place, since researchers are now freer to decide where to apply in
order to obtain financial resources and what to work on. Given the increased number of
funding alternatives available and the individual incentive scheme developed internally,
a considerable amount of researchers compete for external resources attending exclu-
sively to their personal interests, and nobody can be certain as to which strategies other
members of the organisation will pursue. As a consequence, the research organisation
faces a problem of internal co-ordination in the definition and application of a clear and
unitary research strategy. Managers have a better-financed organisation but have lost
part of their power to decide over an efficient use of resources. As Miller has put it in
Managerial Dilemmas: “Individuals in hierarchies inevitably find themselves in situa-
tions in which their own self-interest is clearly in conflict with organisational effi-
ciency” [31]. This problem of co-ordination can be exacerbated by the fact that the dif-
ferent funding alternatives benefit some members of the research organisation against
the others.
Therefore, the access to external sources of funding, although has been thought of as
a solution to certain problems, can in turn open the way to new ones. The PRCs might
have to face a collective action problem: how to involve all its researchers into a collec-
tive research strategy that would make the functioning of the organisation more efficient
and effective.
This is undoubtedly something that requires further exploration, although it goes be-
yond the aim of this paper. On the one hand, to what extent the access to external
sources of funding generates problems of internal co-ordination within the research or-
ganisations which, in turn, affect to their efficient functioning and to the final results of
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their work. On the other, what are the possible solutions to these co-ordination and effi-
ciency problems. Related to these, it might be useful to go back to Miller’s words as a
starting point for further enquiry:
“The solution to the co-ordination problem –achieving more efficient rather than
less efficient solutions to repeated social dilemma games– involves personal char-
acteristics and shared perceptions of the actors involved, the political skills of or-
ganisational leaders, and the constitutional resolution of the ultimate political
problems of power sharing in organisations” [31: 233].
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